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We examine whether business groups’ inﬂuence on cash holdings depends on
ownership. Group aﬃliation can increase ﬁrms’ agency costs or beneﬁt ﬁrms
by providing an internal capital market, especially in transition economies
characterized by weak investor protection and diﬃcult external capital acquisi-
tion. A hand-collected dataset of Chinese ﬁrms reveals that group aﬃliation
decreases cash holdings, alleviating the free-cash-ﬂow problem of agency costs.
State ownership and control of listed ﬁrms moderate this beneﬁt, which is more
pronounced when the ﬁnancial market is less liquid. Group aﬃliation facilitates
related-party transactions, increases debt capacity and decreases investment-
cash-ﬂow sensitivity and overinvestment. In transitional economies, privately
controlled ﬁrms are more likely to beneﬁt from group aﬃliation than state-
controlled ﬁrms propped up by the government.
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This paper investigates the eﬀect of business groups on ﬁrms’ cash policies and whether it depends on own-
ership structure. A business group is a set of legally independent ﬁrms bound together by formal and informal
ties (for an overview of business groups, see Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). This unique organizational form is
internationally widespread, especially in transition economies. For instance, Claessens et al. (2002) ﬁnd that
in eight of the nine Asian countries they study, the top ﬁfteen family groups control more than 20% of the
listed corporate assets. In particular, up to the end of 2006, Chinese business groups contributed above
60% of the nation’s industrial output (Sutherland, 2009). Despite their signiﬁcant contribution to national
economies, the general understanding of business groups in emerging countries has thus far been inadequate.
The literature suggests two competing explanations of how business groups aﬀect corporate cash holdings.
A predominant view in corporate ﬁnance is based on the free-cash-ﬂow hypothesis, which posits that in the
presence of agency costs of managerial discretion, management has incentives to hold excess cash for its
own objectives at shareholders’ expense (Jensen, 1986). The complicated ownership and organizational struc-
ture of business groups result in a higher level of information asymmetry than seen in standalone ﬁrms, which
inevitably exacerbates the agency conﬂicts between managers and shareholders. Alternatively, business group
aﬃliation beneﬁts ﬁrms by forming an internal capital market. The precautionary motive hypothesis put forth
by Keynes (1936) suggests that in the presence of an internal capital market, business group aﬃliates tend to
hold less cash due to a lower level of ﬁnancial constraints (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). Taken together,
the net eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings depends on which role of the business group dominates the
other. This study explores business groups in China and aims to contribute to the current debate over their
role in emerging economies.
Transition economies like China oﬀer a suitable research setting in which to study the costs and beneﬁts of
business groups for two reasons. First, China is characterized by the coexistence of tremendous economic
achievements and an underdeveloped institutional environment. As the largest emerging economy, China
has experienced unprecedented economic growth during the past three decades. However, the country’s inves-
tor protection is among the worst worldwide. Allen et al. (2005) suggest that China ranks the lowest in terms
of investor protection among the countries included in a study by La Porta et al. (1998). External ﬁnancing in
the country can be very costly or even unavailable (Ayyagari et al., 2010). In such a context, business groups
may serve extensive governance functions by creating an internal capital market (He et al., 2013) and enhanc-
ing intra-group guarantees and ﬁnancing ﬂexibility (Chang and Hong, 2000). Second, despite its transition
from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy, China has maintained a state-dominated
ﬁnancial system in which the government has substantial inﬂuence over the allocation of ﬁnancial resources
(Cai et al., 2014). The state-dominated ﬁnancial system usually favors state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by pro-
viding them ﬁnancial support in the forms of preferential loans, state subsidies, IPO/SEO opportunities and so
forth. As opposed to their SOE counterparts, non-SOEs (NSOEs) face greater diﬃculties accessing external
ﬁnance. Thus, a business group is likely to serve as an internal capital market to mitigate the ﬁnancial con-
straints facing NSOEs.
Our empirical ﬁndings are as follows. Using a panel of 6633 Chinese listed non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms covering
2008–2011, we ﬁnd that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly less cash than their unaﬃliated counterparts.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that the precautionary motive of aﬃliated ﬁrms to hold cash is weaker
due to the lower level of constraints imposed by the internal capital market. In addition, we examine whether
the eﬀects of business groups on cash holdings diﬀer between SOEs and NSOEs. The results show that the role
of business groups in decreasing cash reserves is economically and statistically more prominent among
NSOEs. In subsequent analysis, we exploit an exogenous shock to the credit supply as a result of tight mon-
etary policy during 2010–2011. As expected, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the decrease in credit supply due to
the monetary policy change strengthens the relationship between business groups and cash holdings and that
this relationship is more pronounced among NSOEs.
We perform several additional analyses to shed light on the mechanisms through which business groups can
mitigate capital constraints. First, we examine whether group aﬃliates are involved in more related-party
transactions. Consistent with Jia et al. (2013), we ﬁnd a positive relationship between business groups and
the amount of related-party transactions, providing direct evidence of the internal capital market mechanism
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that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms have a higher debt capacity than their unaﬃliated peers, suggesting that business
groups help aﬃliated ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnancing. Next, we examine whether group aﬃliates face fewer
ﬁnancial constraints than unaﬃliated ﬁrms. The results show that the former exhibit a lower level of
investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity than the latter. Finally, further analysis indicates that group aﬃliation
decreases the level of overinvestment. This eﬀect is more pronounced among NSOEs, suggesting that business
groups contribute to decreasing the free-cash-ﬂow problem.1
Our study contributes to the business group and cash policy literature. We provide evidence based on a tran-
sition economy, which oﬀers an interesting institutional setting in which to compare the cost and beneﬁt eﬀects
of group aﬃliation. He et al. (2013) analyze the relationship between business groups and investment-cash-ﬂow
sensitivity but do not examine the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on cash holdings, which is a more direct measure of
the agency problem associated with free cash ﬂow. In addition, the sample used by He et al. (2013) only goes up
to 2006. Given the signiﬁcant eﬀect of China’s split share structure reform (SSSR) on corporate cash holdings,
our study exclusively focuses on the post-reform period (i.e., 2008–2011).2 Moreover, unlike prior studies of
business groups in China (e.g., Keister, 1998; Fan et al., 2008; Carney et al., 2009), which may suﬀer from
the problem of small-sample bias, we consider all of the publicly traded group aﬃliates in China. The rich data
of the listed ﬁrms yield relatively unbiased results (He et al., 2013). Our ﬁndings suggest that in transition econo-
mies like China, ﬁrms propped up to a lesser extent by the government are more likely to beneﬁt from business
group aﬃliation. The policy implication stemming from our evidence is that group aﬃliation for SOEs may be
less justiﬁed given that the underlying agency cost may not be oﬀset by capital acquisition beneﬁts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy introduces China’s business groups
and institutional factors. Section 3 provides the literature review and hypothesis development. Section 4 dis-
cusses the research design and sample. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses the results of
additional analyses. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2. Institutional background
2.1. Business groups in China
A key aspect of the economic reform generating China’s unprecedented growth is the establishment of busi-
ness groups, known as qiyejituan in Chinese. To facilitate China’s economic transition from a centrally
planned economy to a market-oriented economy without causing the chaos seen in other ex-communist econo-
mies such as Russia, business groups have been introduced as intermediary institutions and economic engines
for economic development (Keister, 1998; Yiu et al., 2005). In the mid-1980s, business groups increased
rapidly with the encouragement and assistance of the state. It is widely believed that such groups can develop
new technology, deliver superior ﬁnancial performance and achieve economies of scale. In one decade, busi-
ness groups in China went from non-existent to numbering more than 7000 by the early 1990s. As of 1995, the
state-owned business groups were valued at 1.12 trillion yuan (USD$135.7 billion), one quarter of the nation’s
total state-owned assets (Kan, 1996).
Through the establishment of two stock exchanges in the early 1990s, some business groups began to
include both publicly traded ﬁrms and SOEs in their portfolios of aﬃliated ﬁrms. As the listed group aﬃliates
are independent legal entities that are required to disclose their ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information regu-
larly, we can clearly identify aﬃliated ﬁrms by their corporate structures. In addition, the ﬁnancial informa-
tion pertaining to these ﬁrms yields rich data for our large-sample analysis. Fig. 1 demonstrates the complexity
of a business group in China. Founded in 1969, Wanxiang Group includes four listed aﬃliated ﬁrms, including
one in Shanghai and three in Shenzhen.31 We acknowledge the referee for raising this point.
2 Chen et al. (2012) investigate the sensitivity of cash holdings to the split share structure reform using a sample covering 2000–2008.
They ﬁnd that by 2008 more than 79% ﬁrms had completed the conversion of non-tradable shares to tradable shares.
3 Consistent with He et al. (2013), we do not include ﬁrms with shares traded in non-domestic markets such as Hong Kong and the
United States.
Individual
Wanxiang Group Wanxiang Sannong Co.,
Ltd.
Wanxiang Resources Co., Ltd.
Wanxiang Qianchao Co., Ltd.
(000559. SZ) 
Lanbao Technology Co., Ltd.
(000631. SZ) Chengde LoLo Co., Ltd.(000848. SZ) 
Wanxiang Doneed Co., Ltd.
(600371. SH) 
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10.88%
61.05%
61.20%
42.55%
Figure 1. Structure of Wanxiang Group. Source: 2008 Annual Report of Relevant Firms.
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sector concentrate on strategic and ‘‘life-blood” industries in the national economy. As a result, the number of
business groups has declined in recent years and their economic signiﬁcance has improved. For instance,
although the number of business groups at various levels fell to 2767 in 1999, their value now accounts for
more than 50% of the assets of all SOEs and NSOEs (Ma, 2005).
Many scholars consider business groups an organizational response to the underdeveloped institutions of
emerging economies (e.g., Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a,b; Jian and Wong, 2010). Thus,
ﬁrms in emerging countries may be better oﬀ as parts of business groups due to higher transaction costs and
because such groups can act as intermediaries between economic actors and imperfect markets by ﬁlling insti-
tutional voids. In contrast, the relatively lower transaction costs in developed economies with more eﬃcient
capital markets, stronger legal protection and better ﬁnancial intermediaries decrease the need for an internal
capital market and the broad diversiﬁcation oﬀered by business groups.
Business group structures vary across countries, exhibiting diﬀerences in both formal links (such as own-
ership structure) and informal ties (such as family, kinship and friendship) (Morck et al., 2005). Chinese busi-
ness groups are most similar to those in Japan and Korea, partly because Chinese oﬃcials have been observing
and learning about Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol for years (Ma, 2005). However, Chinese business
groups diﬀer from keiretsu and chaebol in the following two ways. First, Korean chaebols are characterized
by private ownership with limited bank involvement, and Japanese keiretsus have multiple corporate owners,
typically centered on a main bank (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002). However, Chinese business groups involve
considerable government intervention. Second, Chinese business groups are more focused, although some-
what more diversiﬁed, than keiretsus and chaebols. This is particularly true for state-owned business groups,
as the government requires them to act as the leading players or national champions in their sectors. As such,
China oﬀers an ideal laboratory in which to analyze the eﬀect of ownership structure on the role of business
groups.2.2. Ownership structure of Chinese listed ﬁrms
A distinct feature of China’s stock markets is the dominant role of state ownership in Chinese listed ﬁrms.
For example, nearly two thirds of Chinese listed ﬁrms are currently still under state control. Compared with
their NSOE counterparts, SOEs usually have multiple objectives, including not only proﬁt maximization but
also social aims such as the creation of job opportunities and maintenance of social stability. In return, the
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tance. For instance, stock market regulators always treat SOEs preferentially by oﬀering them listing privileges
(Aharony et al., 2000). In addition, SOEs have greater access to equity oﬀerings for capital needs (Gordon and
Li, 2003), debt ﬁnancing (Sapienza, 2004; Jia, 2009) and state subsidies, particularly when they face ﬁnancial
distress (Chen et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2014). Consequently, SOEs are expected to be associated with less
ﬁnancial constraints and bankruptcy risk than NSOEs.
It was not until 2005, when China underwent the SSSR, that state and legal person shares became freely
tradable on the stock exchanges. Before the reform, such shares could be exchanged only under special circum-
stances at a negotiated price and with government approval. The reform required non-tradable shares to
become tradable after the end of a lock-up period. For most ﬁrms, the lock-up period ended in 2007/2008,
after which the shareholders were able to sell up to 50% of their shares in the following six months (Chen
et al., 2009). As a major policy change, the SSSR has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬁnancing activities of Chi-
nese listed ﬁrms in areas such as cash policy (Chen et al., 2012) and leverage decisions (Liu and Tian, 2012). To
parse out the potential confounding eﬀect of the SSSR on cash holdings, we focus exclusively on the post-
reform period (i.e., 2008–2011) in the present study. We believe that doing so allows us to better answer
our research question about the link between business groups and cash holdings.
2.3. China’s monetary policy during 2008–2011
Firms’ cash-holding incentives are likely to be aﬀected by external factors such as ﬁnancial market liquidity.
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has had a profound inﬂuence around the world. All of the major economies suﬀered
from a sudden contraction of liquidity and China was no exception. The main concern of China’s monetary
policy before the crisis was controlling inﬂation, as its consumer price index was far above 3%. However, as
the unexpected crisis hit China’s economy, the government promptly switched its monetary policy from pre-
venting the economy from overheating to stimulating the economy by expanding domestic demand to oﬀset a
slump in exports resulting from the ﬁnancial crisis. To achieve this, the Chinese government loosened the
once-tight monetary policy in 2008, with China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), slashing
benchmark interest rates by a factor of ﬁve and the deposit requirement ratio by a factor of four. Moreover,
during 2008–2009, the government put a 4-trillion-yuan (USD$586 billion) stimulus package in place to bol-
ster economic expansion and help sustain global growth. The central bank further loosened credit controls in
2009, which spurred a surge in new bank loans of 9.6 trillion yuan, up from 4.9 trillion yuan in 2008.
China’s monetary policy entered into a tightening cycle in 2010 for two reasons. First, China’s domestic
economy experienced a strong recovery as a result of the loose monetary policy and proactive ﬁscal policy
in 2008–2009. Second, China was facing rising inﬂation and the threat of hot money inﬂows expected from
the quantitative easing policy of the U.S. In an eﬀort to counteract these eﬀects, China’s stance gradually
swung from ‘‘loose” to ‘‘appropriately tight.” For instance, the PBC had raised interest rates ﬁve times and
the deposit requirement ratio nine times by August 2011.
Studies have used the broad deﬁnition of money to measure China’s monetary policy based on the PBC
oﬃcially deﬁning its intermediate target as M2 in 1996 (Xie, 2000). Fig. 2 presents the targeted and actually
realized growth rates of M2 for the period 2005–2011. As expected, the actual growth rate peaked at 28.4 in
2009 and then declined to 17.3 by 2011. Given the preceding discussions, we deﬁne the loose (tight) monetary
policy period as 2008–2009 (2010–2011) in this study.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1. Literature related to business groups
The past two decades have witnessed a surge in research related to business groups. Most of this literature
focuses on emerging economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a,b; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), based on the argu-
ment that business groups are more common in countries with poor legal and regulatory institutions
(Granovetter, 2005). Studies have examined the eﬀect of business groups through a wide array of indicators
such as market valuation (e.g., Bae and Jeong, 2007; Bae et al., 2008), ﬁnancial constraints (e.g., Shin and
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Target M2 growth Actual M2 growth
Figure 2. Targeted and actual growth rates of M2 2005–2011.
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et al., 2013), ﬁnancial performance (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Carney
et al., 2011) and tunneling (e.g., Bae et al., 2002; Baek et al., 2006). In contrast, limited empirical evidence
has been produced to show the eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings. Without making a strict distinction
between aﬃliates and non-aﬃliates, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) examine the eﬀect of bank power on cash
holdings and ﬁnd that Japanese keiretsu members hold less cash than other ﬁrms. A recent study by
Locorotondo et al. (2014) documents a negative relationship between business group aﬃliation and cash
holdings based on a sample of Belgian ﬁrms.
3.2. Literature related to corporate cash holdings
Neoclassic economics theory suggests that a ﬁrm’s optimal cash holdings should be at a level such that the
marginal beneﬁt of the cash holdings is equal to their marginal cost. A vast number of studies have corre-
spondingly focused on the determinants and motives of cash holdings in diﬀerent contexts, such as the U.
S. (e.g., Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009), the U.K. (e.g., Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), Italy
(e.g., Bigelli and Sa´nchez-Vidal, 2012) and other countries (e.g., Campello et al., 2012; Dittmar et al., 2003;
Pinkowitz et al., 2006). However, studies of cash holdings in China remain scant, with the exceptions of those
by Wu et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2012). Wu et al. (2012) examine the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening on the
relationship between trade credit and cash holdings. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms in regions of higher ﬁnancial devel-
opment hold less cash for payables and substitute more receivables for cash. Chen et al. (2012) suggest that
there is a negative relationship between the SSSR and the cash holdings of Chinese listed ﬁrms. Our study
extends and complements these papers by focusing on the group-cash relationship, in which business groups
appear to capture liquidity demand, beyond the factors examined in previous studies.
3.3. Hypothesis development
The precautionary motive proposes that cash is held as a buﬀer to guard against unexpected contingencies
or cash deﬁciencies (Keynes, 1936; Hill et al., 2014). Opler et al. (1999) suggest that ﬁrms with strong growth
opportunities, riskier cash ﬂows and less access to capital markets hold more cash. Extending a study by Opler
et al. (1999), Han and Qiu (2007) ﬁnd a positive relationship between cash holdings and cash ﬂow volatility
among ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Acharya et al. (2007) provide theoretical and empirical evidence showing
that ﬁrms with greater hedging needs hold more cash. In a subsequent study, Bates et al. (2009) also document
a positive relationship between cash holdings and cash ﬂow volatility. They indicate that the precautionary
motive dominates agency conﬂicts in explaining the increase in cash holdings. A recent study by Hill et al.
(2014) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with political connections hold less cash due to decreased concerns about liquidity
shortages.
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ﬁrms’ liquidity strategies by decreasing the uncertainty of future cash ﬂows in several ways. First, business
groups allow the formation of internal capital markets, which can partially replace the external markets in
meeting the ﬁnancial needs of aﬃliated ﬁrms. A group pools funds from its aﬃliated members and reallocates
them to the most proﬁtable projects. As such, business groups can be seen as a more eﬃcient channel for allo-
cating capital and managerial resources among aﬃliated ﬁrms. This is especially the case when external mar-
kets are underdeveloped. In addition, business groups can beneﬁt aﬃliated ﬁrms by facilitating risk sharing
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). This is done mainly through the transfer of resources from well-performing aﬃl-
iates to poorly performing ones, particularly during times of ﬁnancial diﬃculty. For instance, Prowse (1992)
provides evidence that group aﬃliates assist member ﬁrms that are suﬀering from ﬁnancial distress so as to
ensure the long-term survival of the group. This is corroborated by Friedman et al. (2003), who ﬁnd that
group controllers tend to prop up aﬃliated ﬁrms during a crisis using their private funds or group-wide sav-
ings. Given intra-group coordination and internal transactions, business groups can decrease the bankruptcy
probabilities of aﬃliated ﬁrms (Lincoln et al., 1996), which may in turn decrease the precautionary motive for
holding cash.
In addition to providing internal capital markets, business groups may help aﬃliated ﬁrms to obtain exter-
nal ﬁnancing. Group aﬃliation can improve the debt-bearing capacity of member ﬁrms by linking the member
ﬁrms to one another. Group reputation enables aﬃliates to gain access to external credit (Chang and Hong,
2000; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). In addition, intra-group guarantees help aﬃliated ﬁrms to gain
ﬁnancing through bank loans and corporate bonds, as the assets of one group ﬁrm can serve as collateral
for other member ﬁrms (Shin and Park, 1999; Verschueren and Deloof, 2006).
Overall, business group aﬃliations are expected to yield improved access to ﬁnance and an ability to gen-
erate more stable future cash ﬂows, in turn decreasing the precautionary motives of aﬃliated ﬁrms to hold
cash. As long as this eﬀect dominates the potential agency problem often associated with business groups
(La Porta et al., 1999; Bae et al., 2002; Morck et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010), we expect a negative association
between group aﬃliation and cash holdings. These arguments lead to our ﬁrst hypothesis.
H1. Business-group-aﬃliated ﬁrms hold less cash than their unaﬃliated counterparts.
Studies have suggested that political connections play a dominant role in ﬁrms’ cash policies. Faccio et al.
(2006) document that politically connected ﬁrms are more likely to be bailed out by the government in times of
distress than non-connected peers. This implicit guarantee in turn disincentivizes ﬁrms from retaining excess
cash. Political connections appear to be more explicit in China than in Western economies and are reﬂected in
the form of state ownership. As discussed in Section 2.2, China’s state-dominated ﬁnancial system favors
SOEs. Compared with their NSOE counterparts, SOEs are more likely to exhibit the soft budget constraint
formulated by Kornai (1980). According to soft budget constraint theory, an organization with a budget con-
straint can always depend on a supporting organization to bail it out when its budget constraint is breached.
In China, SOEs have better access to external ﬁnancing through either the banking sector or the equity mar-
kets than NSOEs (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Megginson and Wei, 2013). Furthermore, SOEs are more likely to
receive ﬁnancial assistance when facing ﬁnancial distress (Cull and Xu, 2000). Therefore, the marginal eﬀect of
business groups in terms of mitigating ﬁnancial constraints and decreasing cash holdings driven by precaution-
ary motives should be greater among NSOEs than SOEs. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis.
H2. The inverse relationship between business groups and cash holdings is more pronounced among NSOEs
than among SOEs.
In addition to micro-level ﬁrm characteristics, macroeconomic factors such as monetary policy aﬀect ﬁrms’
cash-holding decisions (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Zaman, 2011; Harford et al., 2012). The monetary trans-
mission mechanism is particularly important for ﬁrms. Whenever monetary policy changes, market interest
rates such as mortgage and bank deposit rates change accordingly. These changes in turn aﬀect the investment
and ﬁnancing behavior of ﬁrms in the economy. For example, other things being equal, higher interest rates
resulting from tight monetary policy tend to encourage ﬁrms to hold more liquidity rather than make invest-
ments. In such circumstances, bank borrowing may become very expensive or even unavailable, making ﬁnan-
cially constrained ﬁrms more vulnerable than others and thereby having a signiﬁcant bearing on their cash or
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Figure 3. Percentage of group-aﬃliated ﬁrms.
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et al., 2005), the sensitivity of this form of ﬁnancing to monetary policy changes can be highly signiﬁcant. As
discussed previously, business groups are likely to decrease ﬁrms’ cash holdings through the channels of both
internal and external ﬁnancing. We expect that the eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings is more promi-
nent in times of tight monetary policy. Furthermore, compared with their SOE counterparts, NSOEs suﬀer
from a higher level of capital constraints, as explained in Section 2.2. Therefore, we expect that the interaction
eﬀect of monetary policy and business groups on cash holdings is more pronounced among NSOEs than
SOEs. Hence, we put forward the following hypotheses.
H3a. Group-aﬃliated ﬁrms hold even less cash than unaﬃliated ﬁrms in times of tight monetary policy than
they do in times of loose monetary policy.
H3b. The relationship in H3a is more pronounced for NSOEs than for SOEs.4. Research design
4.1. Sample and data
We base our sample selection on all of the ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges dur-
ing 2008–2011. As explained earlier, we restrict our sample to begin in 2008 to circumvent the inﬂuence of the
SSSR on cash holdings (Chen et al., 2012). We collect the business aﬃliation data manually from the annual
reports of the listed ﬁrms. Following He et al. (2013), we identify a ﬁrm’s group aﬃliation in each year based
on whether its ultimate controller has more than one listed ﬁrm in that year.4 Fig. 3 demonstrates the propor-
tion of group-aﬃliated ﬁrms over our sample period. On average, group-aﬃliated ﬁrms account for 50% of all
of the listed ﬁrms. This proportion is higher than that in a study by He et al. (2013), who ﬁnd it to be slightly
above 30% in 2006. The diﬀerence arises mainly due to the acceleration of mergers and acquisitions in China in
recent years, which has resulted in a growing number of group aﬃliates. In addition, as shown in Fig. 3, there
is a dramatic decrease in the proportion of group-aﬃliated ﬁrms in 2011, although the number of aﬃliated
ﬁrms stays almost the same as that in previous years. This drop is driven by a sharp increase in the number
of listed ﬁrms following the launch of China’s Growth Enterprise Board.4 We deﬁne business groups as having at least two listed ﬁrms. Business groups in China were originally encouraged to publically list
their strongest son ﬁrms. As a result, almost all Chinese listed ﬁrms are aﬃliated with a business group (Jiang et al., 2010; Jia et al., 2013).
Our classiﬁcation is likely to bias the results against ﬁnding a negative association between group aﬃliation and cash holdings because
internal capital markets may also exist in our non-group sample. In other words, our results may become stronger if we restrict business
groups to have at least one listed company.
W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24 9Our analyses call for a separation of SOEs and NSOEs. We identify an SOE (NSOE) based on whether its
ultimate controller is a state asset management bureau or other government-related unit. We retrieve the infor-
mation related to ultimate controllers from the CCER Sinoﬁn Database. Finally, we download the ﬁnancial
and accounting data used in our analyses from the China Security Markets and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database.
Table 1 Panel A summarizes the sample selection process. Of the 8629 initial ﬁrm-year observations, we
remove 651 observations that are listed for less than 1 year. In addition, we eliminate 147 ﬁrm-year observa-Table 1
Sample selection and distribution.
Sample selection process Firm-year observations
Panel A: Sample selection process
Initial sample from 2008 to 2011 8629
Less:
Firms listed for less than one year 651
Financial ﬁrm-years 147
Firm-years with insuﬃcient data 1198
Final sample 6633
Year Total Stand-alone sample
(GROUP = 0)
Aﬃliated sample
(GROUP = 1)
Panel B: Annual distribution of business groups
2008 1457 684 773
2009 1544 724 820
2010 1650 789 861
2011 1982 1089 893
Total 6633 3286 3347
Industry Total Standalone sample
(GROUP = 0)
Aﬃliated sample
(GROUP = 1)
Panel C: Industry distribution of business groups
Agriculture, forestry and
ﬁshing
105 69 36
Mining 194 57 137
Food 273 159 114
Textile 224 156 68
Wood and furniture 36 28 8
Papermaking and
printing
122 90 32
Petroleum, chemical
products and rubber
704 321 383
Pharmaceutical 491 271 220
Metal and non-metal 562 255 307
Equipment
manufacturing
1121 540 581
Electric machinery 400 232 168
Other manufacturing 34 30 4
Utilities 294 76 218
Construction 156 70 86
Transportation 269 62 207
Information technology 215 159 56
Trade 532 217 315
Real estate 554 290 264
Service 203 118 85
Media 56 37 19
Other 88 49 39
Total 6633 3286 3347
10 W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24tions from the ﬁnancial sector and 1198 ﬁrm-year observations with insuﬃcient data for our study. The ﬁnal
sample consists of 6633 ﬁrm-year observations.
Table 1 Panel B presents the yearly distribution of the sample. The numbers of both group-aﬃliated and
unaﬃliated ﬁrms increase gradually across the years. In particular, a signiﬁcant increase is observed in the
number of unaﬃliated ﬁrms, from 789 in 2010 to 1089 in 2011. This further explains why the proportion
of aﬃliated ﬁrms decreases signiﬁcantly in 2011, as demonstrated in Fig. 3.
Table 1 Panel C presents the industry distribution of observations, where the industries are based on the
classiﬁcations of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Equipment manufacturing constitutes
the largest share with 1121 observations, 581 of which are aﬃliated with business groups. Other manufactur-
ing is the smallest sector with 34 observations, only 4 of which are group aﬃliated.
4.2. Model speciﬁcation
We examine the association between cash and business groups based on the framework implemented by
Opler et al. (1999), variants of which have been used to test several issues related to cash holdings (e.g.,
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Fritz Foley et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008). We estimate the following equation:CASHi;t ¼ a0 þ a1GROUPi;t þ a2LIQi;t þ a3SIZEi;t þ a4Qi;t þ a5LEV i;t þ a6CF i;t þ a7CAPEX i;t
þ a8DIV i;t þ a9CONCENi;t þ year þ Industry þ ei;t ð1Þwhere for ﬁrm i in year t CASH refers to cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets, i.e., total assets minus
cash and cash equivalents; GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero
otherwise; LIQ refers to working capital minus cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets; SIZE is the
natural logarithm of total assets; Q is the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets;
LEV refers to total liabilities divided by total assets; CF refers to operating cash ﬂow scaled by total assets;
CAPEX refers to capital expenditure divided by total assets; DIV is the ratio of cash dividends to earnings;
and CONCEN is the share proportion of the largest shareholder divided by the share proportion of the second
largest shareholder. If H1 is supported and business group aﬃliates hold less cash than unaﬃliated ﬁrms, then
we should observe that a1 is signiﬁcantly negative. Table 2 presents the variable deﬁnitions.
To test H2, which states that the eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings is more pronounced for NSOEs
than for SOEs, we estimate Eq. (1) for the NSOE and SOE subsamples, respectively. If H2 is true, then we
expect that the coeﬃcient of GROUP is greater for the NSOE subsample. In addition, we test whether the
diﬀerence between the GROUP coeﬃcients for the two groups is statistically signiﬁcant.
To test whether the relationship between group aﬃliation and cash is ampliﬁed in times of tight monetary
policy as hypothesized in H3a, we adopt a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach by including a policy dummy
(POLICY) and an interaction term between POLICY and GROUP in Eq. (1). The regression model is thus
expressed as follows:CASHi;t ¼ b0 þ b1GROUPi;t þ b2POLICY i;t þ b3GROUP  POLICY i;t þ b4LIQi;t þ b5SIZEi;t þ b6Qi;t
þ b7LEV i;t þ b8CF i;t þ b9CAPEX i;t þ b10DIV i;t þ b11CONCENi;t þ Industry þ ei;t ð2Þwhere POLICY is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation occurs during a period of tight mon-
etary policy (i.e., 2010–2011) and zero otherwise (i.e., 2008–2009). H3a is supported if b3 is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative. To further test H3b, we estimate Eq. (2) separately for the NSOE and SOE subsamples. We expect that
b3 is signiﬁcantly more negative for NSOEs.
5. Empirical findings
5.1. Summary statistics
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for both the unaﬃliated (in Panel A) and
aﬃliated (in Panel B) ﬁrms. All of the variables except the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. The average cash-to-assets ratios of the unaﬃliated and aﬃliated samples are 0.300 and 0.221,
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variables Deﬁnitions
Cash holding (CASH) Cash and cash equivalents/(total assets-cash and cash equivalents)
Business group (GROUP) A ﬁrm is identiﬁed as a group-aﬃliated ﬁrm in each year if its ultimate controller had more than one
listed ﬁrm in that year. GROUP equals one for group-aﬃliated ﬁrms and zero otherwise
State ownership (SOE) Dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate controller of the ﬁrm is the government and zero
otherwise
Tight monetary policy
(POLICY)
Dummy variable that equals one for tight monetary policy periods (i.e., 2010–2011) and zero otherwise
(i.e., 2008–2009)
Liquid substitutes (LIQ) (Working capital  cash and cash equivalents)/total assets
Firm size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets
Tobin Q (Q) Market value of total assets/book value of total assets
Leverage (LEV) Total liabilities/total assets
Cash ﬂow (CASHFLOW) Operating cash ﬂow/total assets
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) Capital expenditures/total assets
Dividend (DIV) Cash dividends/earnings
Ownership concentration
(CONCEN)
The ratio of the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder to the percentage of shares held by
the second largest shareholder
Return on asset (ROA) Net income/total assets
Fix assets ratio (FIX) Fix assets/total assets
Asset growth rate
(GROWTH)
(Total asset in year t-total assets in year t  1)/total assets in year t  1
Firm age (AGE) Number of years since the ﬁrm’s inception
Investment level (INVEST) Investment expenditure/total assets
Accumulative return (RET) Buy-and-hold return calculated based on monthly returns of the year
Free cash ﬂows (FCF) (Operating cash ﬂow  normal investment expenditure)/total assets
Tunneling opportunity
(TUNNEL)
Other receivables/total assets
Minority equity (MINO) Minority equity/total equity
Executive compensation
(PAY)
Natural logarithm of the three highest paid executives’ compensation
Share concentration (TOP) Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder
Board size (BSIZE) Number of directors on the board
Independent directors
(INDEP)
Number of independent directors on the board
W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24 11respectively, which are higher than the respective values of 0.145 and 0.176 found by He et al. (2013). The
diﬀerence arises partly due to the diﬀerent sample periods we examine.5 Another important observation is that
unaﬃliated ﬁrms hold greater cash reserves on their balance sheets than their aﬃliated peers at both the mean
and median levels, lending initial support to H1. This pattern is more evident during the period of tight mon-
etary policy (i.e., 2010–2011). As seen in Panel C, the diﬀerence in CASH between the two subsamples is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level over 2010–2011 but insigniﬁcant over 2008–2009. This ﬁnding is consistent
with H3a.
Turning to the statistics for the control variables, on average, group-aﬃliated ﬁrms have higher levels of
size, leverage, cash ﬂow, capital expenditure, dividend payments and ownership concentration and lower liq-
uidity and Tobin’s Q than unaﬃliated ﬁrms. However, the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences varies across the
years.5.2. Pearson correlations
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. As expected, GROUP is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated
with CASH, suggesting that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms tend to hold less cash than their unaﬃliated counterparts.
This is once again consistent with H1. In addition, CASH is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with liquidity,5 The sample period in the study by He et al. (2013) is 1998–2006.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the main variables. This table presents descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm-level characteristics of the unaﬃliated and aﬃliated samples for the period 2008–2011.
The variables are deﬁned as follows: CASH is calculated as cash and cash equivalents/(total assets  cash and cash equivalents). LIQ is calculated as (working capital  cash and cash
equivalents)/total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Q is deﬁned as the market value of total assets/book value of total assets. LEV is total liabilities/total assets.
CASHFLOW is operating cash ﬂow/total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures/total assets. Dividend (DIV) is measured as the ratio of cash dividends to earnings. CONCEN is the
share proportion of the largest shareholder/share proportion of the second largest shareholder. Diﬀ shows the diﬀerence in means between the two subsamples. P-value shows the p-
values of tests for the equality of means. All of the variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Period Obs. CASH LIQ SIZE Q LEV CASHFLOW CAPEX DIV CONCEN
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Unaﬃliated sample (GROUP = 0)
2008 684 0.193 0.116 0.086 0.036 21.068 20.993 1.567 1.244 0.510 0.495 0.048 0.046 0.050 0.036 0.287 0 9.867 3.468
2009 724 0.244 0.146 0.080 0.024 21.176 21.095 2.724 2.104 0.505 0.494 0.059 0.056 0.034 0.033 0.232 0 9.345 4.011
2010 789 0.332 0.177 0.040 0.005 21.286 21.209 2.958 2.298 0.479 0.475 0.039 0.044 0.048 0.038 0.206 0.063 9.346 4.100
2011 1089 0.382 0.197 0.042 0.078 21.374 21.249 1.980 1.476 0.404 0.386 0.019 0.022 0.065 0.054 0.302 0.148 7.925 3.501
Total 3286 0.300 0.161 0.031 0.014 21.245 21.146 2.293 1.685 0.467 0.464 0.039 0.040 0.051 0.042 0.261 0.059 8.982 3.743
Panel B: Aﬃliated sample (GROUP = 1)
2008 773 0.189 0.131 0.085 0.087 21.854 21.693 1.278 1.081 0.528 0.537 0.050 0.048 0.059 0.041 0.390 0.045 15.218 8.244
2009 820 0.232 0.152 0.079 0.072 21.985 21.802 2.202 1.827 0.529 0.547 0.063 0.058 0.050 0.034 0.253 0.074 15.971 8.608
2010 861 0.229 0.144 0.058 0.050 22.170 22.004 2.305 1.805 0.532 0.549 0.043 0.043 0.051 0.037 0.215 0.086 15.575 8.065
2011 893 0.232 0.140 0.050 0.039 22.321 22.182 1.622 1.307 0.534 0.543 0.032 0.033 0.056 0.041 0.271 0.123 15.351 7.659
Total 3347 0.221 0.142 0.068 0.061 22.092 21.921 1.861 1.448 0.531 0.544 0.047 0.045 0.054 0.038 0.280 0.094 15.530 8.095
Period Obs. Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value
Panel C: Comparison of ﬁrm characteristics between unaﬃliated and aﬃliated ﬁrms
2008 1457 0.004 0.3671 0.001 0.4876 0.786 0.0000 0.289 0.0000 0.018 0.0493 0.002 0.3306 0.009 0.0068 0.103 0.0028 5.351 0.0000
2009 1544 0.012 0.2230 0.001 0.4714 0.809 0.0000 0.522 0.0000 0.023 0.0151 0.004 0.2019 0.015 0.0275 0.021 0.1987 6.626 0.0000
2010 1650 0.103 0.0000 0.018 0.0924 0.884 0.0000 0.653 0.0000 0.052 0.0000 0.004 0.1532 0.003 0.2954 0.009 0.3234 6.229 0.0000
2011 1982 0.150 0.0000 0.092 0.0000 0.946 0.0000 0.358 0.0000 0.130 0.0000 0.013 0.0003 0.004 0.2311 0.031 0.0878 7.426 0.0000
Total 6633 0.079 0.0000 0.037 0.0000 0.847 0.0000 0.432 0.0000 0.064 0.0000 0.008 0.0001 0.003 0.1617 0.019 0.0732 6.548 0.0000
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W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24 13Tobin’s Q, cash ﬂow and dividends, and negatively correlated with ﬁrm size, leverage, capital expenditure and
ownership concentration. This indicates that these control variables are important in explaining a ﬁrm’s cash
policy and should therefore be included in multivariate analyses. Finally, the correlation coeﬃcients of the
main variables are less than 0.7, suggesting that multicollinearity should not be a concern in this study
(Lind et al., 2002).5.3. Test of H1
Table 5 presents pooled OLS regressions to determine the eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings in the
ﬁrst two columns. As reported in column (1), the coeﬃcient of GROUP is signiﬁcantly negative (0.0536,
t-stat = 6.65). In terms of economic interpretation, a one-standard-deviation increase in the likelihood of
being group aﬃliated precedes a roughly 5% decrease in the cash ratio. The result is not sensitive to the
inclusion of a variety of control variables (0.0166, t-stat = 2.25) as shown in column (2). This suggests a
substantial weakening in the demand for cash from aﬃliated ﬁrms, consistent with H1.
All of the control variables except for Tobin’s Q signiﬁcantly explain ﬁrms’ cash levels. For instance, the
non-cash liquidity substitute (LIQ) has a negative eﬀect on cash. The results also show that larger ﬁrms hold
larger amounts of cash, which does not lend support to the view that larger ﬁrms hold less cash because such
ﬁrms are less capital constrained and more diversiﬁed. This ﬁnding suggests that other factors may explain the
eﬀect of size on cash holdings (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). In addition, more leveraged (LEV) ﬁrms hold sig-
niﬁcantly less cash, a ﬁnding in line with the notion that ﬁrms with a higher level of leverage incur higher
opportunity costs of holding cash (Baskin, 1987) and/or have greater access to external ﬁnance (Ferreira
and Vilela, 2004). Furthermore, ﬁrms with a higher level of cash ﬂow (CASHFLOW) tend to hold more cash,
as internally generated funds are critical drivers of cash. Consistent with other studies (e.g., Hill et al., 2014;
Locorotondo et al., 2014), the coeﬃcient of capital expenditure (CAPEX) is negative and that of dividends
(DIV) is positive. Finally, ownership concentration (CONCEN) is negatively associated with cash holdings,
a ﬁnding consistent with the view that the presence of strong controllers may lead to a reduction in agency
costs, which in turn implies that ﬁrms with strong controllers have lower cash reserves.
The preceding results estimated from the OLS regressions provide support for H1, which states that group-
aﬃliated ﬁrms hold less cash than their unaﬃliated peers. However, as suggested by Khanna (2000), OLS
regressions may suﬀer from severe self-selection bias in this case, as group aﬃliation may be endogenously
selected based on unobserved ﬁrm characteristics, leading to a bias in the coeﬃcient estimates. In an eﬀort
to address the potential selection bias issue, we implement a variant of the Heckman two-stage approach:
the treatment eﬀect model.6 In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate a logit model for group aﬃliation on a bunch of vari-
ables that are likely to inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s decision to become aﬃliated with a given group. Apart from the control
variables in the preceding OLS regressions, we include some other variables in the ﬁrst-stage regression: ﬁxed
asset ratio (FIX), return on assets (ROA), asset growth rate (GROWTH), lagged aﬃliation status (L_GROUP)
and ﬁrm age (AGE). We then include the hazard ratio (HAZARD) based on the logistic regression in the ﬁrst
stage with CASH as the dependent variable. Controlling for potential selection bias does not weaken our main
results, as shown in column (4). For instance, the coeﬃcient of GROUP remains negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant (0.019, t-stat = 2.33). Furthermore, the coeﬃcient of the hazard ratio (HAZARD) is positive but
insigniﬁcant (0.006, t-stat = 0.82), implying that selection bias may not be a concern in our study.75.4. Test of H2
Table 6 presents the results of subsample analyses of the group-cash relationship. The results in column (2)
pertain to the NSOE subsample, and column (3) reports the results for the SOE subsample. The coeﬃcient of6 Although the dependent variable is only observed for a subset of sample participants in the Heckman two-stage model, it is observed
for both the treated and untreated subsamples in the treatment eﬀect model (Guo and Fraser, 2010). In our study, both aﬃliated and
unaﬃliated samples are observable. In such cases, the treatment eﬀect model is more appropriate than the Heckman two-stage model for
capturing potential self-selection bias.
7 Untabulated results suggest that our main ﬁndings also remain unaﬀected when a propensity score matching approach is adopted.
Table 4
Correlation matrix for the main variables. This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the ﬁrm-level characteristics for the full sample. The variables are deﬁned as follows:
CASH is calculated as cash and cash equivalents/(total assets  cash and cash equivalents). GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero
otherwise. LIQ is calculated as (working capital  cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Q is deﬁned as the market value of total
assets/book value of total assets. LEV is total liabilities/total assets. CASHFLOW is operating cash ﬂow/total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures/total assets. Dividend (DIV) is
measured as the ratio of cash dividends to earnings. CONCEN is the share proportion of the largest shareholder/share proportion of the second largest shareholder. All of the variables
except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are p-values.
CASH GROUP LIQ SIZE Q LEV CASHFLOW CAPEX DIV CONCEN
CASH 1.0000
GROUP 0.1136
(0.0000)
1.0000
LIQ 0.0482
(0.0001)
0.0638
(0.0000)
1.0000
SIZE 0.1822
(0.0000)
0.3183
(0.0000)
0.1028
(0.0000)
1.0000
Q 0.1717
(0.0000)
0.1326
(0.0000)
0.2340
(0.0000)
0.4737
(0.0000)
1.0000
LEV 0.3960
(0.0000)
0.1449
(0.0000)
0.5631
(0.0000)
0.2189
(0.0000)
0.0669
(0.0000)
1.0000
CASHFLOW 0.1327
(0.0000)
0.0447
(0.0002)
0.1155
(0.0000)
0.0553
(0.0000)
0.0534
(0.0000)
0.1556
(0.0000)
1.0000
CAPEX 0.1250
(0.0000)
0.0121
(0.3234)
0.1178
(0.0000)
0.1618
(0.0000)
0.1804
(0.0000)
0.1290
(0.0000)
0.1807
(0.0000)
1.0000
DIV 0.0374
(0.0023)
0.0178
(0.1463)
0.0744
(0.0000)
0.1136
(0.0000)
0.0975
(0.0000)
0.1136
(0.0000)
0.0338
(0.0059)
0.0749
(0.0000)
1.0000
CONCEN 0.0846
(0.0000)
0.1557
(0.0000)
0.0038
(0.7568)
0.1147
(0.0000)
0.0822
(0.0000)
0.0577
(0.0000)
0.0023
(0.8500)
0.0267
(0.0299)
0.0075
(0.5409)
1.0000
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Table 5
Eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings. This table presents regression results of the eﬀect of business groups on cash holdings for the
full sample. The variables are deﬁned as follows: CASH is calculated as cash and cash equivalents/(total assets  cash and cash
equivalents). GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero otherwise. LIQ is calculated as (working
capital  cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Q is deﬁned as the market value of total
assets/book value of total assets. LEV is total liabilities/total assets. CASHFLOW is operating cash ﬂow/total assets. CAPEX is capital
expenditures/total assets. DIV is measured as the ratio of cash dividends to earnings. CONCEN is the share proportion of the largest
shareholder/share proportion of the second largest shareholder. FIX is measured as ﬁxed assets/total assets. ROA is measured as net
income/total assets. GROWTH is measured as the growth rate of total assets. AGE is the number of years since the ﬁrm’s inception.
L_GROUP is the lagged term of GROUP. HAZARD is the hazard ratio calculated from the ﬁrst stage. All of the variables except for the
dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity corrected
t-statistics.
OLS Treatment eﬀect model
CASH First stage Second stage
GROUP CASH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GROUP 0.0536***(6.65) 0.0166**(2.25) 0.0190**(2.33)
LIQ 0.3638***(13.58) 0.3640***(13.58)
SIZE 0.0062*(1.83) 0.1389***(5.69) 0.0065*(1.90)
Q 0.0034(0.68) 0.0035(0.69)
LEV 0.8691***(25.09) 0.8690***(25.09)
CASHFLOW 0.3376***(5.80) 0.3377***(5.80)
CAPEX 0.4769***(6.39) 0.4781***(6.38)
DIV 0.0143***(2.66) 0.0143***(2.66)
CONCEN 0.0005***(5.76) 0.0018**(2.26) 0.0005***(5.70)
FIX 0.1816(0.90)
ROA 0.0250(0.06)
GROWTH 0.0051(0.11)
L_GROUP 3.3713***(57.18)
AGE 0.0238***(4.18)
HAZARD 0.0060(0.82)
Intercept 0.1156***(8.67) 0.3618***(2.64) 5.1091***(8.48) 0.3571***(2.60)
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y Y
Obs. 6633 6633 6633 6633
Adj. R2 0.1051 0.3121 0.3121
Log likelihood 1084.750
* Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided).
W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24 15GROUP is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level among NSOEs (0.0326, t-stat = –2.19), but signiﬁcantly
positive among SOEs (0.0206, t-stat = 1.92). The results provide evidence that the former ﬁrms are being
propped up to a lesser extent by government support and therefore have a greater precautionary motive than
the latter ﬁrms. In other words, the beneﬁts of aﬃliating with a business group appear to be greater for
NSOEs. Meanwhile, group aﬃliation magniﬁes the free-cash-ﬂow problem for SOEs, in which managers’ pri-
vate interests diverge from the interests of the ﬁrms they manage.
Further comparison of the coeﬃcient of GROUP suggests a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups
(p-value = 0.001). Taken together, these results support H2, suggesting that although group aﬃliation signif-
icantly decreases the cash holdings of ﬁrms with greater precautionary motives, the eﬀect is moderated by the
state ownership of listed ﬁrms.5.5. Test of H3a and H3b
Table 7 presents the results for the eﬀect of monetary policy on the association between group aﬃliation
and cash balances. To perform a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation, we estimate Eq. (2), in which POLICY
Table 6
Eﬀect of business groups and state ownership on cash holdings. This table presents regression results of the eﬀect of business groups on
cash holdings for the non-state-owned (NSOE) and state-owned (SOE) subsamples, respectively. The variables are deﬁned as follows:
CASH is calculated as cash and cash equivalents/(total assets  cash and cash equivalents). GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one
if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero otherwise. LIQ is calculated as (working capital  cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. SIZE is
the natural logarithm of total assets. Q is deﬁned as the market value of total assets/book value of total assets. LEV is total liabilities/total
assets. CASHFLOW is operating cash ﬂow/total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures/total assets. DIV is measured as the ratio of cash
dividends to earnings. CONCEN is the share proportion of the largest shareholder/share proportion of the second largest shareholder. All
of the variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics. The numbers reported in brackets are p-values comparing the coeﬃcients between the two
subsamples.
CASH
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample NSOEs SOEs
GROUP 0.0166**(2.25) 0.0326**(2.19) 0.0206*(1.92)
[P-value of equality test] [0.001]**
LIQ 0.3638***(13.58) 0.4542***(12.51) 0.3199***(7.54)
SIZE 0.0062*(1.83) 0.0069(1.11) 0.0123***(3.22)
Q 0.0034(0.68) 0.0066(1.02) 0.0230***(2.79)
LEV 0.8691***(25.09) 1.1584***(22.19) 0.5766***(12.19)
CASHFLOW 0.3376***(5.80) 0.2594***(3.16) 0.4404***(5.52)
CAPEX 0.4769***(6.39) 0.4993***(5.58) 0.5806***(5.78)
DIV 0.0143***(2.66) 0.0255**(2.38) 0.0037(0.66)
CONCEN 0.0005***(5.76) 0.0003(1.49) 0.0004***(5.20)
Intercept 0.3618***(2.64) 0.7739***(4.16) 0.0530(0.48)
INDUSTRY Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y
Obs. 6633 2901 3732
Adj. R2 0.3121 0.3872 0.2555
* Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided).
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2010–2011) and zero otherwise (i.e., 2008–2009). The coeﬃcient of interest is the interaction between group
aﬃliation and tight monetary policy (GROUP * POLICY). Supporting H3a, column (1) shows that the group-
policy interaction is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating that the moderating role of the group
on cash reserves is more noticeable during a period of tight monetary policy. Columns (2) and (3) report the
relationships for NSOEs and SOEs, respectively. In line with our expectation as stated in H3b, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient of GROUP * POLICY is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level for NSOEs (0.0716, t-stat =
–2.50) but insigniﬁcant for SOEs (0.0275, t-stat = 1.36). The diﬀerence is also statistically signiﬁcant
(p-value = 0.008). This indicates that the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on cash balances during periods of tight
monetary policy is conﬁned to ﬁrms with an innate disadvantage in acquiring external ﬁnancing. Another
important observation is that during periods of relatively loose monetary policy, group-aﬃliated SOEs
(0.034, t-stat = 2.74) tend to hold economically and statistically more cash than aﬃliated NSOEs (0.0059,
t-stat = 0.27). The diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient of GROUP is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results suggest that
SOEs suﬀer from more severe agency problems than NSOEs, which causes the corporate cash holdings of the
former ﬁrms to deviate from the level needed for operational and investment purposes (Chen et al., 2012).6. Further analyses
The preceding results show that business group aﬃliates hold lower cash reserves than their unaﬃliated
peers. Our interpretation of these results is that group aﬃliation can improve aﬃliates’ access to both internal
and external capital markets, consistent with the precautionary motive explanation for holding cash. To gain
further insight into the mechanism by which group aﬃliations alleviate the capital constraints of aﬃliates, we
Table 7
Eﬀect of tight monetary policy on the group-cash relation. This table shows how the eﬀect of business groups and state ownership on the
cash holdings is inﬂuenced by exogenous monetary policy. The variables are deﬁned as follows: CASH is calculated as cash and cash
equivalents/(total assets  cash and cash equivalents). GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero
otherwise. POLICY is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is under a tight monetary policy (i.e., 2010–2011) and zero otherwise.
LIQ is calculated as (working capital  cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Q is deﬁned
as the market value of total assets/book value of total assets. LEV is total liabilities/total assets. CASHFLOW is operating cash ﬂow/total
assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures/total assets. DIV is measured as the ratio of cash dividends to earnings. CONCEN is the share
proportion of the largest shareholder/share proportion of the second largest shareholder. All of the variables except for the dummy
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics. The
numbers reported in brackets are p-values comparing the coeﬃcients between SOEs and NSOEs.
CASH
Full sample NSOEs SOEs
(1) (2) (3)
GROUP 0.0271***(2.89) 0.0059(0.27) 0.0340***(2.74)
[P-value of equality test] [0.026]**
POLICY 0.1196***(10.51) 0.1132***(8.41) 0.0581***(3.05)
GROUP * POLICY 0.0834***(6.02) 0.0716**(2.50) 0.0275(1.36)
[P-value of equality test] [0.008]***
LIQ 0.3613***(13.55) 0.4503***(12.45) 0.3196***(7.53)
SIZE 0.0077**(2.34) 0.0092(1.49) 0.0125***(3.47)
Q 0.0044(0.94) 0.0044(0.76) 0.0223***(2.99)
LEV 0.8631***(25.05) 1.1559***(22.28) 0.5771***(12.25)
CASHFLOW 0.3445***(5.93) 0.2663***(3.25) 0.4373***(5.48)
CAPEX 0.4859***(6.47) 0.5029***(5.61) 0.5851***(5.83)
DIV 0.0125**(2.33) 0.0254**(2.37) 0.0035(0.63)
CONCEN 0.0005***(5.98) 0.0003(1.46) 0.0004***(5.27)
Intercept 0.3129**(2.52) 0.7390***(4.02) 0.0452(0.44)
INDUSTRY Y Y Y
Obs. 6633 2901 3732
Adj. R2 0.3139 0.3869 0.2548
* Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided).
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party transactions) and external ﬁnancing (debt capacity) and lowering ﬁnancial constraints (investment-cash-
ﬂow sensitivity). In addition, we examine whether business groups help to decrease the investment ineﬃciency
induced by the free-cash-ﬂow problem.6.1. Business group and related-party transactions
Drawing on internal market theory (Leﬀ, 1978), business groups beneﬁt aﬃliated ﬁrms by forming eﬃcient
group-wide internal labor and capital markets. To provide direct evidence of the veracity of this argument, we
examine the association between group aﬃliation and internal ﬁnancing while paying particular attention to
related-party transactions (RPT), which are prevalent in China (e.g., Keister, 1998). The CSRC mandates that
all Chinese listed ﬁrms disclose such transactions in their ﬁnancial reporting, which enables us to investigate
the internal resource ﬂows within a business group. These transactions mainly include inter-corporate lending
and loan guarantees; internal purchases and sales of goods or assets; and leases. To capture the intra-group
related-party transactions, we exclude those not occurring between members of the same business group. We
employ a Tobit regression as follows:RPT i;t ¼ a0 þ a1GROUPi;t þ a2SIZEi;t þ a3LEV i;t þ a4GROWTHi;t þ Year þ Industry þ ei;t ð3Þ
where for ﬁrm i and year t RPT is the value of intra-group related-party transactions divided by total assets,
GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is aﬃliated with a group and zero otherwise, SIZE is
18 W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV refers to total liabilities divided by total assets and GROWTH is the
growth rate of total assets. We also control for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 8 presents the results. Consistent with Jia et al. (2013), we document a positive and signiﬁcant asso-
ciation between GROUP and RPT (0.043, t-stat = 17.32). According to an economic interpretation, a one-
standard-deviation increase in group aﬃliation results in a 4.3% increase in the amount of related-party
transactions within a group. Turning to split-sample analysis, as reported in columns (2) and (3), the eﬀect
of group aﬃliation on related-party transactions is more pronounced for NSOEs (0.031, t-stat = 6.40) than
for SOEs (0.021, t-stat = 5.94). The coeﬃcient of GROUP diﬀers signiﬁcantly between the two groups
(p-value = 0.000). This lends further support to our main ﬁnding that business groups play a greater role in
decreasing cash balances for NSOEs.6.2. Business groups and debt capacity
In addition to facilitating the internal capital markets, business groups can improve the debt-bearing capac-
ity of aﬃliates (e.g., Chang and Hong, 2000; Manos et al., 2007). To conﬁrm our conjecture, we estimate the
following pooled OLS regression:Table
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þ Industry þ ei;t ð4Þwhere for ﬁrm i and year t LEV is a proxy for debt capacity. To enhance the robustness of our analysis, we use
two measures for LEV: LEV1, which is calculated as total liabilities (i.e., short-term loans plus long-term
loans) divided by the book value of total assets, and LEV2, which is calculated as total liabilities divided
by the market value of total assets. All of the other variables are as deﬁned previously expect for TA, which
refers to tangible assets divided by total assets. Table 9 presents the results.
As shown in column (1), the coeﬃcient of GROUP is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (0.0223,
t-stat = 4.39). This indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in group aﬃliation leads to a 2.23%
increase in loans from debt markets. When it comes to split-sample analysis, as shown in columns (2) and
(3), the positive eﬀect of group aﬃliation on debt capacity occurs for NSOEs (0.030, t-stat = 2.79) but not8
liated ﬁrms have more related party transactions within the groups? This table presents Tobit regression results of the eﬀect of
ss groups on related party transactions within the groups. The dependent variable is related party transactions, measured by the
t of related party transactions within a group divided by total assets. The other variables are deﬁned as follows: GROUP is a
y variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total
ies/total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate of total assets. All of the variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at
and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics. The numbers reported in brackets
alues comparing the coeﬃcients between SOEs and NSOEs.
Related party transactions
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample NSOEs SOEs
P 0.0431***(17.32) 0.0306***(6.40) 0.0210***(5.94)
e of equality test] [0.000]***
0.0098***(8.18) 0.0116***(5.21) 0.0115***(7.52)
0.1318***(14.76) 0.1340***(8.92) 0.1201***(10.57)
TH 0.0044**(2.02) 0.0030(1.03) 0.0108***(3.70)
pt 0.1696***(4.13) 0.172***(3.62) 0.224***(5.08)
STRY Y Y Y
Y Y Y
6542 2835 3707
R2 0.1891 0.3466 0.1099
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided).
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided).
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided).
Table 9
Do aﬃliated ﬁrms have a higher debt capacity than unaﬃliated ﬁrms? This table presents OLS regression results of the eﬀect of business groups on debt capacity. The dependent
variable in measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, where total assets are calculated in book value in Panel A and market value in Panel B. The other variables are deﬁned as
follows: GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. TA is tangible assets/total assets.
ROA is the return on total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate of total assets. CONCEN is the share proportion of the largest shareholder/share proportion of the second largest
shareholder. All of the variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity corrected t-
statistics. The numbers reported in brackets are p-values comparing the coeﬃcients between SOEs and NSOEs.
Panel A: LEV1 Panel B: LEV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample NSOEs SOEs Full sample NSOEs SOEs
GROUP 0.0223***(4.39) 0.0301***(2.79) 0.0070(0.91) 0.0230***(5.48) 0.0210**(2.34) 0.0051(0.81)
[P-value of equality test] [0.033]** [0.076]*
SIZE 0.0283***(9.17) 0.0085(1.39) 0.0391***(13.91) 0.0748***(29.47) 0.0550***(12.09) 0.0859***(32.44)
TA 0.1354***(6.90) 0.1836***(5.49) 0.0772***(3.48) 0.0917***(6.05) 0.1170***(4.85) 0.0488***(2.60)
ROA 0.8872***(16.01) 0.7478***(9.74) 1.0077***(14.14) 0.5883***(13.65) 0.4491***(7.55) 0.7241***(12.88)
GROWTH 0.0074*(1.75) 0.0004(0.07) 0.0171***(3.27) 0.0011(0.32) 0.0046(0.97) 0.0077(1.46)
CONCEN 0.0000(0.45) 0.0004**(2.34) 0.0002***(2.67) 0.0001(1.25) 0.0005***(3.27) 0.0000(0.72)
Intercept 0.1922(1.22) 0.2631*(1.95) 0.3770**(2.34) 1.3821***(22.85) 0.9220***(9.46) 1.5856***(25.70)
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 6633 2901 3732 6633 2901 3732
R2 0.2407 0.2160 0.2808 0.4739 0.3636 0.5187
* Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided). All of the results are based on OLS regression.
** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided). All of the results are based on OLS regression.
*** Indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided). All of the results are based on OLS regression.
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20 W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24for SOEs (0.007, t-stat = 0.91). As expected, the diﬀerence in the GROUP coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the
5% level (p-value = 0.033). The results are not sensitive to the use of the alternative measure for the dependent
variable, as observed in columns (4)–(6). The results oﬀer an extra explanation of the positive association
between business groups and corporate cash holdings.6.3. Business group and investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity
The previous results consistently suggest that group aﬃliations decrease a ﬁrm’s reliance on precautionary
cash holdings. The question that naturally arises is whether group-aﬃliated ﬁrms face less ﬁnancial constraints
than their unaﬃliated peers. He et al. (2013) ﬁnd a negative association between group aﬃliation and ﬁnancial
constraints, proxied by investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity. However, their study focuses on an earlier period
than ours (i.e., 1998–2006). Given the rapid development of China’s economy and the structural change in
the stock markets following the SSSR, a further investigation of the eﬀect of business groups on ﬁnancial con-
straints in recent years is merited. Following Almeida and Campello (2007), we estimate the following
equation:Table
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*** IndCAPEX i;t ¼ a1 þ a2CASHFLOW i;t þ a3GROUPi;t þ a4GROUP  CASHFLOW i;t þ a5SIZEi;t þ a6Qi;t
þ a7LEV i;t þ a8ROAi;t þ Year þ Industry þ ei;t ð5Þwhere all of the variables are as deﬁned previously. The main variable of interest is GROUP * CASHFLOW.
The results for the full sample are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10. Without considering the variation
between the group-aﬃliated and unaﬃliated ﬁrms, Chinese listed ﬁrms exhibit a high level of ﬁnancial con-
straints on average, as the coeﬃcient of CASHFLOW is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. When we
include the business group variable (GROUP) and an interaction term between GROUP and CASHFLOW,
we ﬁnd that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms have a lower level of capital constraints than the unaﬃliated ﬁrms. For
example, the coeﬃcient of GROUP * CASHFLOW is signiﬁcantly negative (0.111, t-stat = 1.83). This10
liated ﬁrms suﬀer less from capital constraints? This table presents OLS regression results of the eﬀect of business groups on
ent-cash ﬂow sensitivity. The variables are deﬁned as follows: CAPEX is capital expenditures/total assets. CASHFLOW is
ing cash ﬂow/total assets. GROUP is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero otherwise. SIZE is the
l logarithm of total assets. Q is deﬁned as the market value of total assets/book value of total assets. LEV is total liabilities/total
ROA is measured as net income/total assets. All of the variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
The numbers reported in brackets are p-values comparing the coeﬃcients between SOEs and NSOEs. The numbers reported in
heses are heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics.
CAPEX
Full sample NSOEs SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FLOW 0.2121***(3.95) 0.2639***(3.33) 0.3200***(3.15) 0.0883***(3.48)
P 0.0064*(1.90) 0.0026(0.44) 0.0028(0.96)
P * CASHFLOW 0.1111*(1.83) 0.2282***(2.78) 0.0333(1.25)
e of equality test] [0.000]***
0.0106***(5.65) 0.0119***(6.37) 0.0201***(4.31) 0.0082***(7.38)
0.0086**(2.53) 0.0084**(2.50) 0.0078*(1.65) 0.0045**(2.18)
0.0825***(3.91) 0.0821***(3.86) 0.1251***(3.84) 0.0119(1.08)
0.1577*(1.92) 0.1623**(2.00) 0.3150**(2.30) 0.0277(0.71)
pt 0.1394***(3.35) 0.1676***(3.87) 0.2800***(3.22) 0.1096***(3.74)
STRY Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
6633 6633 2901 3732
2 0.1283 0.1325 0.1524 0.1816
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided).
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided).
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided).
W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24 21corroborates the results of He et al. (2013), who ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of GROUP * CASHFLOW is 0.1313
(column [1] of Table 3 Panel B). Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that, on average, group aﬃliations help
to decrease the ﬁnancial constraints facing listed ﬁrms.
Columns (3) and (4) report the subsample analysis results. The coeﬃcient of GROUP * CASHFLOW is sig-
niﬁcantly negative for NSOEs (0.228, t-stat = 2.78) but insigniﬁcant for SOEs (0.033, t-stat = 1.25). The
diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.000). The results support the view
that the marginal eﬀect of group aﬃliation is greater for ﬁrms that have more diﬃculty acquiring external
ﬁnancing.
6.4. Business groups and overinvestment
Thus far it is apparent that group aﬃliates hold less cash due to the existence of an internal capital market.
A more intriguing question is whether business groups mitigate or exacerbate the free-cash-ﬂow problem. In
this section, we examine the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on overinvestment, which is the most likely consequence
of retaining free cash ﬂows (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Richardson, 2006).
We estimate the following equation based on the framework adopted by Richardson (2006):Table
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þ a7INVEST i;t1 þ ei;t ð6Þwhere INVEST is measured as investment expenditure divided by total assets. RET is the accumulative return,
calculated based on monthly returns of the year. The ﬁtted value of Eq. (6) is the normal level of investment
and the residual is the abnormal investment estimate. Positive residuals correspond with overinvestment
(OVERINVEST).11
oup aﬃliations decrease overinvestment? This table presents OLS regression results of the eﬀect of business groups on
vestment. The variables are deﬁned as follows: OVERINVEST is the positive residual estimated from Eq. (6). GROUP is a dummy
le that equals one if the ﬁrm is group aﬃliated and zero otherwise. ROA is measured as net income/total assets. FCF refers to free
ow, calculated as (operating cash ﬂow  normal investment expenditure)/total assets. TUNNEL refers to other receivables divided
al assets. MINO is minority equity/total equity. PAY is the natural log of the sum of the three highest paid executives’
nsations. TOP is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. INDEP is
mber of independent directors on the board. All of the variables except for the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
The numbers reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics. The numbers reported in brackets are p-values
ring the coeﬃcients between SOEs and NSOEs.
OVERINVEST
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample NSOEs SOEs
P 0.004**(2.555) 0.008***(3.384) 0.000(0.065)
e of equality test] [0.005]***
0.039*(1.774) 0.014(0.585) 0.050*(1.775)
0.007***(3.347) 0.008(1.512) 0.005(1.041)
EL 0.051*(1.675) 0.021(0.743) 0.099*(1.827)
0.012*(1.732) 0.027**(2.527) 0.002(0.205)
0.001(0.519) 0.003*(1.800) 0.001(0.375)
0.001(0.348) 0.008(1.339) 0.006*(1.877)
0.004(1.025) 0.006(0.716) 0.002(0.444)
P 0.006(0.630) 0.021(1.192) 0.003(0.203)
pt 0.064***(3.192) 0.113***(3.920) 0.033*(1.946)
STRY Y Y Y
Y Y Y
2626 1192 1434
2 0.055 0.050 0.074
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10% level (two-sided).
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5% level (two-sided).
icate signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 1% level (two-sided).
22 W. Cai et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 1–24In the second stage, we estimate the following equation to test the inﬂuence of business groups on
overinvestment:OVERINVEST i;t ¼ b0 þ b1GROUP i;t þ b2ROAi;t þ b3FCF i;t þ b4TUNNELi;t þ b5MINOi;t þ b6PAY i;t
þ b7TOP i;t þ b8BSIZEi;t þ b9INDEP i;t þ ei;t ð7Þwhere FCF is free cash ﬂow, calculated as operating cash ﬂow minus the normal investment expenditure
divided by total assets. TUNNEL refers to other receivables divided by total assets. MINO is calculated as
minority equity divided by total equity. PAY is the natural log of executive pay, measured as the sum of
the three highest paid executives’ compensation. TOP is measured as the percentage of shares held by the lar-
gest shareholder. BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. INDEP is the number of independent direc-
tors on the board.
As Table 11 shows, group aﬃliation decreases overinvestment on average. Moreover, this eﬀect is more
conspicuous among NSOEs (coeﬃcient = 0.008, t-stat = 3.384) than SOEs (coeﬃcient = 0.000,
t-stat = 0.065). These results suggest that business groups have a positive role in decreasing the free-
cash-ﬂow problem, especially for those who experience a greater reduction in cash holdings due to moderated
precautionary motives.
7. Conclusion
Although considerable attention has been paid to the question of why business groups exist, focusing solely
on either the ‘‘tunneling” or ‘‘propping up” functions of business groups fails to fully capture the complexity
and nuance of the question. This study seeks to achieve a better understanding of the role of business groups
by investigating the relationship between group aﬃliation and cash holdings in a transitional economy char-
acterized by weak investor protection and diﬃculties in obtaining external ﬁnancing.
The results show that group aﬃliation signiﬁcantly decreases cash holdings. This supports the ‘‘propping up”
explanation that business groups allow the formation of internal capital markets, which alleviates the free-cash-
ﬂow problem associated with the tunneling function. However, this beneﬁt is moderated by state ownership,
which is associated with higher agency costs. In addition, the eﬀect is more prominent when the ﬁnancial market
is less liquid as a result of tight monetary policy. Finally, in exploring the manner in which business groups aﬀect
ﬁrms’ decisions to hold cash, we ﬁnd that group aﬃliation facilitates related-party transactions, improves debt
capacity and decreases investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity and overinvestment. Furthermore, the eﬀects are more
pronounced among NSOEs, which are propped up by the government to a lesser extent.
This study bridges the business group and cash holding literatures. However, additional research is war-
ranted to explore areas such as the dynamic cash holdings of group-aﬃliated and unaﬃliated ﬁrms. In partic-
ular, studies must determine how SOEs adjust their cash policies when they are privatized. Furthermore, a
growing literature shows that the cash holdings of unaﬃliated ﬁrms serve as a buﬀer against underinvestment
associated with ﬁnancing frictions. Whether the internal capital market can prevent group aﬃliates from
underinvesting is another topic for future research. Finally, the comparison of the group-cash relationship
across countries may also yield new insights.
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